{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"The New Atlantis","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com","author_name":"Brian","author_url":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/author\/brianshim","title":"'Categories of Warfare Are Blurring'","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"4oWNXDy2R3\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/publications\/categories-of-warfare-are-blurring\">&#8216;Categories of Warfare Are Blurring&#8217;<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/publications\/categories-of-warfare-are-blurring\/embed#?secret=4oWNXDy2R3\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;&#8216;Categories of Warfare Are Blurring&#8217;&#8221; &#8212; The New Atlantis\" data-secret=\"4oWNXDy2R3\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(c,l){\"use strict\";var e=!1,o=!1;if(l.querySelector)if(c.addEventListener)e=!0;if(c.wp=c.wp||{},c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage);else if(c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if(!t);else if(!(t.secret||t.message||t.value));else if(\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret));else{for(var r,s,a,i=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),n=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=0;o<n.length;o++)n[o].style.display=\"none\";for(o=0;o<i.length;o++)if(r=i[o],e.source!==r.contentWindow);else{if(r.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message){if(1e3<(s=parseInt(t.value,10)))s=1e3;else if(~~s<200)s=200;r.height=s}if(\"link\"===t.message)if(s=l.createElement(\"a\"),a=l.createElement(\"a\"),s.href=r.getAttribute(\"src\"),a.href=t.value,a.host===s.host)if(l.activeElement===r)c.top.location.href=t.value}}},e)c.addEventListener(\"message\",c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",t,!1),c.addEventListener(\"load\",t,!1);function t(){if(o);else{o=!0;for(var e,t,r,s=-1!==navigator.appVersion.indexOf(\"MSIE 10\"),a=!!navigator.userAgent.match(\/Trident.*rv:11\\.\/),i=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),n=0;n<i.length;n++){if(!(r=(t=i[n]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\")))r=Math.random().toString(36).substr(2,10),t.src+=\"#?secret=\"+r,t.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",r);if(s||a)(e=t.cloneNode(!0)).removeAttribute(\"security\"),t.parentNode.replaceChild(e,t);t.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:r},\"*\")}}}}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n","description":"In an address at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. on September 29, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates explained how future conflicts would combine conventional and irregular elements &mdash; and how the U.S. military should prepare. The following excerpts from his remarks have been lightly edited for clarity. All told, this year&rsquo;s National Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. It is true that the United States would be hard pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short...","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/social-share-default.png","thumbnail_width":930,"thumbnail_height":488}