Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the growing threat of international terrorism prompted lawmakers to reevaluate the nation\u2019s approach to protecting its critical infrastructure. But a recent study by the General Accounting Office suggests that we have left one critical element of our communications infrastructure dangerously unprotected: our commercial satellites.<\/p>\n
For most commercial purposes, the current basic security protections for satellites are adequate. But federal agencies frequently use commercial satellites, and at present they must abide the low security standards even when using the satellites for national security purposes.<\/p>\n
The GAO study, dated August 2002 but not widely published or reported until October, lists the potential threats facing satellites. Although hardened against the rigors of space \u2014 like radiation and debris \u2014 commercial satellites are still vulnerable to attacks from the ground, including \u201cjamming\u201d (blocking communication between a satellite and the ground) and \u201cspoofing\u201d (sending unauthorized signals to a satellite). These techniques can be used to disrupt a satellite\u2019s normal operations, to hijack a satellite, or even to destroy a satellite by sending false commands that could cause it to tumble from its orbit.<\/p>\n
These are not just hypothetical threats. The study describes several incidents in which satellite services used for television, pagers, and GPS were hacked, jammed, or otherwise disrupted. And even when satellites aren\u2019t sabotaged, satellite traffic can be snooped on. The study reports that federal agencies like NASA and the FAA often don\u2019t encrypt satellite communications, both because of cost concerns and because the information being transmitted isn\u2019t sensitive. The military tends to use advanced encryption to protect its sensitive satellite communications, but sometimes there are slip-ups \u2014 as was the case in the summer of 2002, when it was revealed that live video streams from manned and unmanned surveillance planes in the Balkans were being transmitted unencrypted over a commercial satellite, readily accessible to anyone with regular satellite TV equipment.<\/p>\n
Although the Pentagon emphasized that the video feed from the spy planes didn\u2019t compromise any critical information, that episode highlights the potential dangers of our military\u2019s reliance on vulnerable commercial satellites. The Department of Defense uses commercial satellites \u201cto fulfill its communications and information transmission requirements for non-mission-critical data and to augment its military satellite capabilities,\u201d according to the GAO study. During the Desert Shield\/Desert Storm conflict, commercial satellites carried 45 percent of all communications between the U.S. and the Persian Gulf region. Soon thereafter, during the operations in Somalia, there were no American satellites available to cover the region \u2014 neither military nor commercial \u2014 so Russian commercial satellites were used instead.<\/p>\n
According to one Department of Defense official cited in the GAO study, the military\u2019s \u201creliance on commercial satellites is expected to grow through 2020.\u201d Despite that reliance, the military and all the other federal agencies that use satellites only constitute one-tenth of the commercial satellite market. As a result, commercial satellite companies have had little incentive to undertake the costly extra security measures that their private customers don\u2019t need. For instance, a government policy that went into effect in early 2001 requires the use of encryption technology on any commercial satellite transmitting national security information \u2014 but the GAO study says that \u201cno commercial satellite is currently fully compliant\u201d with the policy, since there is \u201cno business case for voluntarily\u201d following it and no mechanism for enforcing it.<\/p>\n
Lurking in the wings is also an entirely new class of threat: space-based attacks on satellites. \u201cPotential space-based weapons include interceptors, such as space mines and orbiting space-to-space missiles, and directed-energy weapons\u201d like lasers. This may sound like science fiction, but it makes sense for potential enemies to seek new ways to exploit our growing dependence on satellites. By crippling key satellites, enemies could disrupt commerce and civil society and vastly degrade our military capability.<\/p>\n
This is why the Pentagon has paid increasing attention to defending our assets in space. Before becoming Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld served as chairman of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. According to that commission\u2019s report, issued in early 2001, the U.S. is \u201cmore dependent on space than any other nation,\u201d but we haven\u2019t made space defense a priority. Our assets in space make an \u201cinviting target,\u201d the report said, and we are \u201can attractive candidate for a \u2018Space Pearl Harbor.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n
The commission made several suggestions related to bureaucratic reorganization, and it also recommended that the Department of Defense start to develop and deploy \u201csystems in space to deter attack on and, if deterrence should fail, to defend U.S. interests on earth and in space.\u201d Many of the commission\u2019s recommendations are beginning to be implemented directly or reflected in Pentagon budget requests.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the growing threat of international terrorism prompted lawmakers to reevaluate the nation\u2019s approach to protecting its critical infrastructure. But a recent study by the General Accounting Office suggests that we have left one critical element of our communications infrastructure dangerously unprotected: our commercial satellites. For most commercial purposes, the current basic security protections for satellites are adequate. But federal agencies frequently use commercial satellites, and at present they must abide the low security standards even when using the satellites for national security purposes. The GAO study, dated August 2002 but not widely…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"template":"","article_type":[4647],"noteworthy_people":[],"topics":[4999,5040],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article\/10134"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/article"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article\/10134\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10134"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"article_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article_type?post=10134"},{"taxonomy":"noteworthy_people","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/noteworthy_people?post=10134"},{"taxonomy":"topics","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topics?post=10134"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}