The Stapledon story, whose early millennia clearly elaborate on \u201cThe Last Judgment,\u201d is rich in satire and imagination. Stapledon creates distinctive races of men with their own abilities, physical characteristics, and cultures: men that can fly, men with telepathic powers, men that are nothing more than huge brains. Civilizations rise and fall due to violence or stagnation; religions and social movements form on the basis of misunderstandings; the past is forgotten and rediscovered. But at a certain point all the races face the necessity or desire for self-transcendence, the inner drive or external push to be more than themselves. And it is just at this moment that most races destroy themselves \u2014 either deliberately via successful evolution of their successors, or unintentionally by unwise use of their scientific powers. Despite the cyclical character of the story, marked by the rise and fall of different races, there is also a broad progressive tendency in the races\u2019 increased power over their physical worlds, over their own bodies and minds, and finally over their own pasts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Some races are happier than others; some periods of time are more blessed. But overall, the last men look back at the story and see it as a tragedy. \u201cIf actual grief has not preponderated over joy, it is because, mercifully, the fulfillment that is wholly missed cannot be conceived.\u201d The last men discover that their own end is coming due to the disintegration of the Sun, and they cannot conceive of a way to save themselves. Instead, they engage in two god-like efforts. The first is an attempt to redeem the tragic past by \u201cparticipation\u201d in it, exemplified by sending this history back to their ancestors. (Stapledon does not here trouble himself much with the paradoxes of time travel.) The last men hope that what they see as signs of providence \u2014 signs for which they are not responsible \u2014 are evidence of a future intelligence yet greater than their own. The second god-like effort is an attempt to seed the cosmos with life, in the hope of beginning somewhere else the long evolution towards intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What drives them, even knowing that there is a limit to their days, is that same impulse for self-transcendence, which becomes their effort to redeem the whole tragic history of intelligent life. With the end looming, they seek to make the finite eternal:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If ever the cosmic ideal could be realized, even though for a moment only, then in that time the awakened Soul of All will embrace within itself all spirits whatever throughout the whole of time\u2019s wide circuit. And so to each one of them, even to the least, it will seem that he has awakened and discovered himself to be the Soul of All, knowing all things and rejoicing in all things. And though afterwards, through the inevitable decay of the stars, this most glorious vision must be lost, suddenly or in the long-drawn-out defeat of life, yet would the awakened Soul of All have eternal being, and in it each martyred spirit would have beatitude eternally, though unknown to itself in its own temporal mode.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Is this passage simply like others in the story, where Stapledon is more obviously satirizing self-deceptive mystical beliefs? And are we to believe that the real future of intelligence rests with the last men\u2019s effort to seed the galaxy with life? If so, then the tragic element of the story becomes the final moral lesson: If intelligence arises again, why should not the whole bloody mess simply repeat itself in some new way? Yet it seems more likely that this passage is not satire at all, and through his own future history Stapledon comes to an important insight: perhaps the human desire for self-transcendence is really a world-transcending aspiration, an \u201cattraction to infinity.\u201d Properly understood, that attraction might open the door to genuine religious faith.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Haldane approaches a similar conclusion at the end of \u201cThe Last Judgment,\u201d where he acknowledges that religion and science teach some of the same lessons, although for different reasons. Religion says that it is a mistake to think that one\u2019s own \u201cideals should be realized,\u201d because \u201cGod\u2019s ways are not our ways.\u201d Science says instead that \u201chuman ideals are the products of natural processes that do not conform to them.\u201d Religion teaches an \u201cemotional attitude to the universe as a whole,\u201d a sense of human limitation that is only confirmed when science illuminates the awesome immensities and complexities of the universe. Both teach us to \u201cconjecture what purposes may be developed\u201d and to think grandly about human plans and our unselfish \u201ccooperation\u201d in them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Both religion and science, in other words, teach that \u201cevents are taking place for other \u2018great and glorious ends\u2019 which we can only dimly conjecture…. Without necessarily accepting such a view, one can express some of its implications in a myth.\u201d If there is even this degree of convergence between religion and science, why prefer myths of the future over existing stories of God\u2019s presence in history? Why look to the future instead of the past? The answer, for Haldane, is because such future-oriented stories are obviously provisional, because they glorify human power and achievement and carry the authority of science, and because they can be constructed to propose no moral absolutes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daedalus<\/em> is a delightful essay, literate and witty. As a scientist, Haldane deserves credit for refusing to provide a guarantee for the human future, and he is right to suggest that our uncertainty stems from \u201cthe old paradox of human freedom re-enacted with mankind for actor and the earth for stage.\u201d But for all the charm of Daedalus<\/em>, Haldane does not recognize that this great paradox is being reenacted without a moral compass, and thus without any serious basis to call what may happen in the future, even if we do not destroy ourselves, genuine \u201cprogress.\u201d The substitution of science fiction for religious tradition is not obviously an advance when it comes to making serious judgments about \u201cgreat and glorious ends,\u201d particularly if those ends finally derive from Daedalus\u2019 willful quest for power. In the end, scientific progress parallels moral progress only if might does indeed make right. And while Socrates might honor the curiosity of Daedalus, even he could not accept such a blind definition of the human good.<\/p>\n\n\n\r\n
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\r\n \r\n\t\tServant of the Ruling Class\t<\/h5>\r\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n Bertrand Russell\u2019s reply to Haldane does not start in an especially promising way. He characterizes Daedalus<\/em> as \u201can attractive picture of the future as it may become through the use of scientific discoveries to promote human happiness,\u201d which hardly seems an adequate description of Haldane\u2019s intention or his belief that the future happiness of our descendants will probably not look attractive to us. In contrast, Russell thinks that science will continue in the future to do what it does in the present: not serve human happiness in general but serve the power of \u201cdominant groups.\u201d This is a proposition that Haldane would not necessarily deny, although he has a deeper view of exactly who is whose master. Russell then says that he will focus on \u201csome of the dangers inherent in the progress of science while we retain our present political and economic institutions\u201d \u2014 yet again, a premise with which Haldane would almost surely agree. So far, at least, there would seem to be no real debate between the two men.<\/p>\n\n\n\nLike Haldane, Russell divides his discussion into various fields of science (physical, biological, anthropological), and he freely combines projection into the future with satiric commentary on the present. In laying out his broad purpose, Russell eventually adumbrates his first real differences from Haldane. Acknowledging the huge effect science has made in shaping the world \u201csince Queen Anne\u2019s time,\u201d Russell observes that the impact of science can take two basic forms: first, \u201cwithout altering men\u2019s passions or their general outlook, it may increase their power of gratifying their desires,\u201d and second, it may change their outlook on the world, \u201cthe theology or philosophy which is accepted by energetic men.\u201d Russell will focus, he says, on the first kind of effect: how science serves existing desires rather than how it creates new worldviews.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This restriction appears curious at first sight, for it gives the appearance of circularity to Russell\u2019s understanding of the results of scientific progress. If he thinks science is problematic under present circumstances, it may be because he is not interested in thinking (\u00e0 la<\/em> Haldane) about the manner in which science may form and change those circumstances. Perhaps he sees science serving the interests of today\u2019s dominant groups because he is not considering how it might create new dominant groups. Russell thus excludes from the start the possibility that science will be anything but \u201cconservative,\u201d and he appears at first critical of modern science precisely for this conservatism.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe divide between the two men turns out to revolve precisely around this difference of emphasis. The key to Russell\u2019s response to Haldane is understanding why Russell thinks that, on balance, science is more likely to serve existing power structures than to challenge them. Russell announces his answer in brief early on: \u201cScience has increased man\u2019s control over nature, and might therefore be supposed likely to increase his happiness and well being. This would be the case if men were rational, but in fact they are bundles of passions and instincts.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n
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\r\n \r\n\t\tThe Cynical Utopian\t<\/h5>\r\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n Russell\u2019s focus in Icarus<\/em> is on the physical and anthropological sciences, which he sees as having had a fourfold effect: increase of population, increase of comfort, increased energy for war, and increased need for large-scale organization. The fact that \u201cmodern industrialism is a struggle between nations for two things, markets and raw materials, as well as for the sheer pleasure of domination,\u201d means that war and large-scale organizations are particularly important. The place of science in this struggle is ambiguous. While on one page he says that the national character of organizational rivalry is something \u201cwith which science has nothing to do,\u201d just a couple of pages later he concludes that \u201cthe harm that is being done by science and industrialism is almost wholly due to the fact that, while they have proved strong enough to produce a national<\/em> organization of economic forces, they have not proved strong enough to produce an international organization.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nWhat stands in the way of international organization, he argues, is that the pleasure produced by rivalry is the driving motivation among the few rich men who control big business. To think that their goal is wealth is to misunderstand them, like thinking that scoring goals is the point of soccer. Were that true, teams would cooperate, for then many more goals could be scored. So too with business: more cooperation would mean more wealth. But in both instances, the really important thing, the team rivalry, would be missing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The power vested in these large organizations is already so great that \u201cthe ideals of liberalism are wholly inapplicable\u201d to the modern world; there is no liberty except for those who control the sources of economic power, no free competition except \u201cbetween States by means of armaments.\u201d The only hope for freedom or democracy in a \u201cscientific civilization\u201d would be if economic and nationalistic competition were to produce one big winner, establishing a \u201ccruel and despotic\u201d global tyranny. But in time, Russell hopes, the energy of the tyrants at the top might flag, leaving behind a \u201cstable world-organization,\u201d a \u201cdiminishment of the evils which now threaten civilization,\u201d and \u201ca more thorough democracy than that which now exists.\u201d Where Haldane looks to the possibility of self-destruction as the potential impetus to moral progress, Russell looks to tyranny as the potential pathway to peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Both Russell and Haldane believe that scientific progress will be best assured under world government. But why this should be so requires some elucidation. Clearly, the key problem for Russell is rivalry combined with the power of modern science, which is one powerful example of how our passions and instincts lead to irrational results as circumstances change. It is clear how tyrannical centralized control could use the power of science to limit rivalry, but less clear how rivalry would not arise even with world organization, once that control loosened and the organization became a \u201cmore thorough democracy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A telling example of how Russell sees world government and its relationship to science comes when he discusses the need to implement birth control measures \u2014 particularly, he seems to expect, among non-white races, so that no nation will grow much faster than others. He expects white races, already showing signs of population decline, to use \u201cmore prolific races as mercenaries,\u201d threatening a revolt that ends in the extermination of the white races. The casual racialism behind such thinking, however common at the time among progressive intellectuals, confirms the extent to which world government, tyrannical or not, is unlikely to be premised on human political equality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When it comes to eugenics and the goal of producing a \u201cbetter race,\u201d however, Russell is not a na\u00efve inegalitarian, and it is here that we reach the crux of his disagreement with Haldane. Like Haldane, Russell expects that eugenic efforts will be attempted and may even work, but on the whole he is skeptical about the moral prospects of positive eugenics. Where Haldane imagines democratic campaigning for this or that eugenic ideal (\u201cVote for Smith and more musicians\u201d), Russell thinks that such decisions \u201cwould of course be in the hands of State officials, presumably elderly medical men. Whether they would be preferable to Nature I do not feel sure. I suspect they would breed a subservient population, convenient to rulers but incapable of initiative. However, it may be I am too skeptical of the wisdom of officials.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russell is also skeptical when it comes to the biochemical control of behavior. This novel capacity would give those in charge \u201cpower beyond the dreams of the Jesuits, but there is no reason to suppose they will have more sense than the men who control education today. Technical scientific knowledge does not make men sensible in their aims, and administrators in the future, will be presumably no less stupid and no less prejudiced than they are at present.\u201d In this, at least, his utopianism about world government is moderated by his realism about human folly and perversion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russell raises this skepticism to the level of principle: Science increases the power of those in power. If their ends are good, they can achieve more good; if their ends are evil, more evil. \u201cIn the present age, the purposes of the holders of power are in the main evil,\u201d so science does harm. \u201cScience is no substitute for virtue; the heart is as necessary for a good life as the head.\u201d By heart, Russell means the \u201csum-total of kindly impulses\u201d which make people \u201cindifferent to their own interest\u201d but in fact serve that interest, once it is properly distinguished from a rationalized \u201cimpulse to injure others.\u201d Intelligence plus such deliberate desire \u201cwould be enough to make the world almost a paradise.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russell is reasonably certain that science could increase the kindly impulses, but also reasonably certain it will never happen. Those who would make the discovery and administer the treatment (he imagines a \u201csecret society of physiologists\u201d kidnapping and treating world leaders) would already have to be governed by natural kindness, otherwise \u201cthey would prefer to win titles and fortunes by injecting military ferocity in recruits.\u201d \u201cAnd so we come back to the old dilemma: only kindliness can save the world, and even if we knew how to produce kindliness we should not do so unless we were already kindly.\u201d The remaining alternatives, Russell believes, are self-extermination or \u201cworld-wide domination by one group, say the United States,\u201d leading eventually to an orderly world government. Yet the \u201csterility\u201d of the Roman empire leads Russell to conclude by wondering whether \u201cthe collapse of our civilization\u201d is perhaps the best answer after all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Such glib and world-weary statements are part of what made Bertrand Russell the man we remember as Bertrand Russell. But there remains a serious claim being put forward. To Haldane\u2019s core assertion that science will produce progress by giving human beings the choice of reform or oblivion, Russell responds that we will likely, and perhaps even should, choose oblivion. Haldane looking forward sees future evolution as our best hope; Russell looking backward sees our evolutionary heritage as a fatal flaw. The full force of an analogy used by Russell at the beginning of his essay only becomes clear at the end: Dogs, he noted, overeat because they are descendants of wolves, who needed to be driven by \u201cinsistent hunger.\u201d Under domestic circumstances, this retained drive hurts dogs. Likewise, human beings have \u201cinstincts of power and rivalry\u201d that are inconsistent with our well-being, and hence self-destructive under present circumstances. And these instincts, it seems, are more likely to be gratified by means of science than altered. We are creatures of our nature, creatures of our passions. Coming closer to the technological brink is not likely to change this fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This outlook helps explain why Russell does not meet Haldane head on by looking at the way science changes the outlook of \u201cenergetic men.\u201d Whatever the guiding theology or philosophy of the day, however influenced it may be by modern science, natural instinct will win out. \u201cScience is no substitute for virtue,\u201d Russell notes, but he puts little weight on the ability of virtue to counter the raw human instinct for power, injury, and rivalry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russell\u2019s skepticism about the strength of virtue creates a moral vacuum, which leads him to dark and dire conclusions. One does not have to believe in man\u2019s overwhelming goodness to wonder whether Russell\u2019s outlook is grounded more in fashionable cynicism than moral realism. If injury, power, and rivalry were as powerful as Russell suggests, then it is hard to see how life is not a great deal more terrible than it already is. Moreover, it is not obvious why the generous and kindly \u201cimpulses\u201d must take a back seat to the darker passions. Russell assumes, at best by analogy, that the rivalrous impulses would be those more conducive to survival. But by his own admission, virtue is not simply unnatural and may act to our benefit. As an example, he cites the Quakers, who controlled a natural greedy impulse in the name of a moral principle (don\u2019t misrepresent prices) and had success as a result. If once useful impulses can become self-defeating, why can\u2019t \u201ckindly\u201d impulses take their places?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In reality, we discover that virtue is of far less interest to Russell than it ought to be. His cynicism about morality\u2019s sway over the human soul is really born of dissatisfied utopianism: \u201cIf men were rational in their conduct … intelligence would be enough to make the world almost a paradise.\u201d But as civilization is not made up mostly of Bertrand Russells, there is little hope for anything other than collapse. From this point of view, Russell looks like a disappointed Haldane, the Haldane who looks with apparent equanimity on the possibility that humanity may finally prove itself unworthy of survival by not surviving. As Haldane put it, \u201cAt worst our earth is only a very small septic area in the universe, which could be sterilized without very great trouble, and conceivably is not even worth sterilizing.\u201d By different roads and for different reasons, both authors come to the same anti-human conclusion. The core difference is that Haldane believes we might become something better by shattering what we are now.<\/p>\n\n\n
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\r\n \r\n\t\tThe Real Meaning of Progress\t<\/h5>\r\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n So where does this debate leave us? It is telling that Haldane refers to G. K. Chesterton towards both the beginning and ending of his essay. The second time he quotes lines of poetry by Chesterton, without attribution, to acknowledge yet again the potentially destructive power of the human intellect. The first time he criticizes The Napoleon of Notting Hill<\/a><\/strong><\/em>, which \u201cprophesied that hansom-cabs would still be in existence a hundred years hence owing to a cessation of invention. Within six years there was a hansom-cab in a museum.\u201d In commenting on this apparent failure of prediction, Haldane gives some indication that he might understand that Chesterton was not really predicting at all, but satirizing predictors just like himself, who (in Chesterton\u2019s words) project small things of the present into big things of the future, \u201cjust as when we see a pig in a litter that is larger than the other pigs, we know by an unalterable law of the Inscrutable it will someday be larger than an elephant.\u201d But it is also possible that Haldane missed the more serious point of Chesterton\u2019s book: even if the future were to look like the present with respect to hansom-cabs, it would not mean that we are failures in the ways that matter most. There would still be ample room for the whole range of human abilities and aspirations to play themselves out both for good and for ill.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThis truth is likely to be lost if we understand the human story in terms of the aspirations outlined in Daedalus<\/em>. Haldane believes in the possibility, although not the necessity, that science will lead to the progressive improvement of the world, because he thinks that human beliefs can accommodate themselves to the changing conditions created by the vast increases in human power. We are driven down that path by a hitherto inchoate, and potentially self-destructive, desire for self-transcendence, a desire that comes into its own when we have the power to make it real. Progress cannot be measured by human happiness, because happiness would produce stagnation. But Haldane\u2019s notion of progress is by necessity discontinuous, since the goodness of one stage of the human story will not be recognizable as such by those at a different stage. Only some imagined being of the far future, heir to the whole human narrative, might be able to look back and see (or construct) the thread that binds it all together, redeeming a chaotic and otherwise tragic past.<\/p>\n\n\n\nRussell rejects Haldane\u2019s picture of progress, because he thinks that there is a fixity to those aspects of human nature that will lead us to use the increased powers granted by science to destructive ends. The powers of science could potentially be used to alter our nature, Russell believes, but our nature provides significant disincentives to doing so in any manner that will serve good ends. Generosity is in short supply, so we should not expect to be engineered or biochemically manipulated to be nicer to each other. To do so we would need to be nice already. Unlike Haldane, Russell in this essay does not explicitly make the realm of virtue and kindly impulses situational, but he does believe that morality is very weak in comparison with other drives. Absent some utopian re-ordering of the world, science really is giving matches to babies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For Russell, science places us on the edge of a cliff, and our nature is likely to push us over the edge. For Haldane, science places us on the edge of a cliff, and we cannot simply step back, while holding steady has its own risks. So we must take the leap, accept what looks to us now like a bad option, with the hope that it will look like the right choice to our descendants, who will find ways to normalize and moralize the consequences of our choice. Russell disarms virtue, Haldane relativizes it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The net result is that a debate about science\u2019s ability to improve human life excludes serious consideration of what a good human life is, along with how it might be achieved, and therefore what the hallmarks of an improved ability to achieve it would look like. Shorn of serious moral content, the measures of \u201cprogress\u201d \u2014 if it can be said to exist at all \u2014 become our amazement at or dissatisfaction with all our discoveries and inventions, our awed anticipation of what might yet be achieved, our terror about what might go wrong along the way. The result of framing the question of scientific progress in this way is evident in the very structure of most popular discussions of science, both in books and on television. Start with a little history to produce an attitude of pride that we know so much more than we once did. Look at what we know now, and stress the dangers of our remaining ignorance. Anticipate the future, and how humbled we are that those who follow us will know far more than we do if only we stick with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Above all, the very thinness of any notion of progress that survives the Haldane-Russell debate \u2014 little more than the fact of accumulation of knowledge and a vague hope that things might turn out well in light of unspecified yet grand civilizational projects \u2014 helps to explain the widespread belief that any<\/em> effort to restrain science on the basis of ethics represents a threat to \u201cscientific progress.\u201d To see this as simply a result of the self-interest of scientists is to do them an injustice. Like Haldane, most scientists are probably unaware of how the belief that morality must adjust to scientific and technological change amounts to saying that might makes right. The sense of threat is partly due to the poverty of thought on the subject, and perhaps the narrow education that is required for making measurable scientific achievements. For restraint doubtless would<\/em> slow accumulation, and (from this point of view) can only represent the triumph of fear over hope. But what is to be said for accumulation when Russell and Haldane have done with it? It serves either the power of the conventionally powerful or the power of the scientists.<\/p>\n\n\n\nA clear-eyed defense of science needs to take seriously the original \u201cbargain\u201d that Haldane himself describes: that free research produces increased well-being. To investigate the meaning of well being, or doing well, means neither the dogmatic acceptance nor the dogmatic rejection of the moral values of one\u2019s neighbors. It requires avoiding cynicism and utopianism about human motives and possibilities. It requires a willingness to look at the question of the human good with care and seriousness. And even if such an investigation yields a complex and mixed picture of what a good life is and how science contributes to it, the defense of science still requires the willingness to encourage what is valued and discourage what is troublesome, knowing that we will face many grave uncertainties and honest disagreements along the way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Greek tale of Daedalus and Icarus illustrates that doubts over the results of human knowledge and ingenuity are hardly new. The debate enshrined in Daedalus<\/em> and Icarus<\/em> suggests that today the great increase in our powers co-exists with a diminished capacity to think about them with any kind of moral realism. By slighting ethics, Haldane and Russell did not serve the cause of science well, since science only matters in human terms if it truly serves our humanity. And that is by no means guaranteed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Is moral progress possible \u2014 and what does it mean?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":20588,"template":"","article_type":[13],"noteworthy_people":[],"topics":[2266,5041,5032],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article\/10001"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/article"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article\/10001\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22159,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article\/10001\/revisions\/22159"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/20588"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10001"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"article_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article_type?post=10001"},{"taxonomy":"noteworthy_people","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/noteworthy_people?post=10001"},{"taxonomy":"topics","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thenewatlantis.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topics?post=10001"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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